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THE IMPACT OF FIRM-TYPE DOMINANCE ON REGIONAL MANUFACTURING GROWTH 
 
Stanley C. W. Salvary 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
Availability of financial capital and location decisions are variables that influence regional 
manufacturing output.  This study maintains that a region’s manufacturing growth depends 
upon the region’s firm-type dominance.  That is, the type of firms that dominate the 
region’s manufacturing output can be classified as non-local (national or foreign - NF) vs. 
local and large vs. small.  Accordingly, for policy analysis, regions can be classified by 
firm-type dominance.  This distinction is important since, invariably, location decision 
options and availability of financial capital are more favourable for the larger NF firms 
than for local firms.  In an attempt to assess the impact of firm-type dominance, this study 
draws upon the dominant industry model which has established that, in any given region, 
there is a dominant industry (the driving force of the region) to which a region’s 
manufacturing growth is linked.  The information on the impact of firm-type dominance on 
a region's manufacturing output may enable policy-makers to design workable (or revise 
existing) manufacturing diversification policies.   
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The loss of jobs due to the relocation or liquidation of firms is the chief cause of a region's 
economic instability.  Based upon a briefing report prepared by the US General Accounting 
Office, between 1979 and 1984, approximately 2.3 million US workers annually were dislocated.  
This dislocation occurred primarily due to layoffs and plant closures in  the manufacturing sector 
[Stafford 1991:51].  Since manufacturing firms' location decisions have been a major 
contributing factor accounting for regional economic instability, the seemingly logical solution is 
for a region to develop a diversification policy (using portfolio theory) to attract manufacturing 
firms into the region in such a manner as to create a diversified regional manufacturing structure.  
According to Grose [1993:23], in the early 1980s, total states' incentives in the form of direct 
outlays and taxes foregone to attract business amounted to $20 billion a year.  Indubitably, a 
diversification policy, that would attract a mix of manufacturing firms to ensure long term 
regional economic stability or at least to minimize severe long term instability, is highly desirable. 
As suggested by Conroy [1975], portfolio theory is a means to diversify away economic 
instability as reflected in a region's rate of unemployment.  Empirical findings on the New 
England region of the US indicate some success with a diversification policy [Rosengren 1990].  
Using portfolio variance analysis, Rosengren [1990] was able to establish that New England had 
  
 
been able to attract a good mix of industries in its employment portfolio.  During 1984-1988, 
unemployment in New England was 3.9% on average as compared to the national average of 
6.7%.  However, cuts in defense spending  and competition from outside the region had eroded 
some of that success [Rosengren 1990].  Data accumulated by Grose [1993:27] revealed that six 
of the New England states are ranked among the bottom ten states in: (a) 1991 for "New and 
Expanded Corporate Facilities by State" (per million population), and (b) "State Economic 
Momentum" given "State Business Incentives" at March 1992. 
This study suggests that, with the aid of a firm-type dominance/industry region analysis, 
state and federal levels of government can formulate productive regional economic policies. 
 
RESEARCH OBJECTIVE 
 
In an empirical study [Salvary 1977], it was established that while manufacturing growth of 
a region is significantly related to the growth of the region’s dominant industry, leakage of 
manufacturing growth/output from the region is attributed to the inability of the region’s 
supportive industries to respond to the growth of the dominant industry.  This study postulates 
that firm-type dominance of regional manufacturing provides an explanation for regional leakage 
of manufacturing output.   
With the foregoing in mind, this research presents and tests a working hypothesis - the 
firm-type dominance of regional manufacturing growth.  The findings on firm-type dominance 
can enable an assessment of the feasibility of particular strategies to combat regional instability.  
In particular, this research attempts to enable an assessment of a region's ability to utilize the 
intuitively appealing strategy of portfolio theory [Conroy 1975] in selecting and attracting 
manufacturing firms.   
Whether the firms desired to be attracted into the region are labour intensive or capital 
intensive, an approach to enhance or stabilize a regional manufacturing output is needed.  As 
suggested by Ersenkal and Dillman [1984:38], if policymakers were to recognize that an 
abundance of a particular industry is not desirable, an attempt should be made to alter some 
aspects of the regional characteristics that could stimulate growth in [or attract] industries 
dependent upon factors which have not been sufficiently developed.  
  
 
The basic question is:  Can diversification policy be effectively implemented by a region?  
Data presented by Grose [1993:27] suggest an ambiguous response.  Some states (e.g., North 
Carolina, Nevada, and Wyoming) with fewer incentives to attract business firms have done better 
than many states with far more incentives.  It is important to note that tax wars among states 
competing for the same industries [Committee of New England of the National Planning 
Association 1954:651] can impede the implementation of such a policy.  While it is likely for 
regions to effectively utilize diversification policy, it would be somewhat difficult in the absence 
of coordinated planning by state and federal policymakers.   
Unmistakably, regional economic development is dependent upon a region’s ability to devise 
means to influence location decisions of individual firms and the flow of financial capital into 
the region [Salvary 2004].  This study maintains that the impact of these factors on any region is 
determined to a great extent by the firm-type dominance of a region as opposed to the industrial 
structure/mix of a region.  Hence, the feasibility of a diversification policy hinges on the 
adherence of policymakers to policies consistent with the specific region’s firm-type dominance.  
 
MINIMALLY NECESSARY CONDITIONS FOR DIVERSIFICATION 
 
Based upon their empirical study, Bremmer and Kesselring [1993:14] concluded that 
education and public goods provided by state governments do have a positive impact on 
investment and economic development.  The availability of these public goods attracts new firms 
to a given location and facilitates continued operations of existing firms, but attempts to entice 
new firms with items such as industrial revenue bonds and equipment tax credits are ineffective. 
This study postulates that to achieve an effective diversification policy, three conditions 
must be satisfied: (1) incentives must be specifically designed to induce the desired mix of 
manufacturing firms; (2) an infrastructure, which is conducive to the operations of the desired 
mix of firms, must be built and maintained; and (3) the industrial climate must be nurtured by the 
availability of financial capital and an adequately trained labour force.  The ability to satisfy these 
three conditions would enhance the ability of the region to attract and retain manufacturing firms. 
Apparently, the findings of Coughlin and Segev (2000:346), which included labour force quality 
and transportation infrastructure among, in part do support the three conditions outlined above.    
  
 
Unequivocally, tax wars among states competing for the same industries have to be 
avoided.  Therefore, cooperation and coordination of effort among the federal and state levels of 
governments are essential to the regional success of a diversification policy.  At this stage, the 
concepts of the state regions and the industry regions are introduced.  
 
STATE REGIONS AND INDUSTRY REGIONS 
 
Some studies [Carlton 1983; McHone 1984] use the Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area 
(SMSA) as the region, while other studies [Helms 1985; Steinnes 1984] use the state as the 
region.   In this study, two types of regions are used: state-regions and industry-regions.  A state-
region is a region in physical space linked by a common administrative unit which influences 
economic development.  An industry-region is a region in economic space linked by a common 
dominant industry which influences regional manufacturing growth [Salvary 1977].   
Gertler [1984:74] posed two questions: (A) "How volatile is investment in a given industry 
in a given place over time?”  (B) "How consistent is this volatility from region to region?"  With 
regards to (A), the state-region permits an analysis of the volatility of financial capital flows.  In 
connection with (B), the industry-region (a different dimension to regional analysis) enables an 
assessment of the consistency in the volatility of regional financial capital flows. 
As indicated above, this study uses the state as the basic region.1  The state is chosen as the 
basic region in this study for three reasons: 
1.    Unemployment insurance is administered at the state level. 
 
2.    The level and type of tax and other incentives necessary to undertake a diversification 
policy can only be undertaken at the state level.  
 
3.    Infrastructure building, such as highways, conducive to the healthy economic climate 
is undertaken primarily at the state level. 
 
Apart from the normal response to market forces--internal economies of scale and 
agglomeration--that affect the location decision problem, some regions grow faster than others 
due to greater capital inputs into the state regions.  The disparity in regional growth may be due 
to a greater rate of investment or greater capital input-output ratio for the faster growing regions.  
It is hypothesized that a stagnant region may have funds that are exported to another growing 
  
 
region, in many instances to a region that is much more developed--the backwash effect [Myrdal 
1957].  This condition would obtain since the mix of the firms in a region (local vs national 
firms) - the firm-type dominance hypothesis - influences the flow of capital in and from the 
region.  Accordingly, the next section addresses the issue of the availability of financial capital - 
the capital availability problem. 
 
THE AVAILABILITY OF FINANCIAL CAPITAL 
 
Invariably, firms obtain their financing from the national pool of investment funds [Salvary 
2004].  Yet, all firms do not get their efficient share of the investment pool (the capital 
availability problem).  Large firms through corporate dividend policy escape the capital market 
rationing process; hence, more efficient smaller firms are denied financing for expansion purposes.  
Corporate earnings retention as the primary source of finance for manufacturing capital expenditures 
is an ongoing trend [Rumelt 1974; Sherman 1968; Brittain 1966; Donaldson 1961; Cottle and 
Whitman 1959; Meyer and Kuh 1959; Drobovolsky 1951; Lintner 1949].  Use of internally 
generated funds significantly affects the rationing of financial capital because this financing is only 
minimally subject to the scrutiny of the capital market [Rumelt 1974:155; Donaldson 1961:51-52]. 
Kalecki [1954:92-95] and Hamberg [1956:34] have clearly emphasized the significance of 
capital availability in the investment decision and the inaccessibility of the capital market to 
small firms.  In this regard, Fotheringham [1985] (1) implicitly recognized the need to determine 
the characteristics of the firms making the location decisions, and (2) proposed that an explanation 
of regional growth should entail a modeling of the decision processes of individual firms.  
Therefore, foreign direct investment in US manufacturing is a factor that has to be considered. 
According to Stafford [1991:51]: "Although there is now a substantial literature on plant 
closings, knowledge and theory still lag behind understandings of manufacturing investments and 
the location of new plants."  Like the core-periphery dichotomy to regional growth (the spread 
effect and backwash), the firm-type dominance/industry region approach attempts to explain 
regional growth variation (the responsiveness effect).  At this stage, the dominant industry 
hypothesis is introduced and the firm-type dominance hypothesis of regional manufacturing 
growth, which reflects an integrated approach, is formulated.2  
  
 
THE DOMINANT INDUSTRY AND FIRM-TYPE DOMINANCE HYPOTHESES 
 
This study utilizes the concept of the dominant industry as introduced in the literature as a 
causal factor [Salvary 1977].  An industry which accounts for 10% or more of a region's 
manufacturing value added is a dominant industry.  If that industry has not only met the 10% 
requirement but is the largest single industry in the region, it is the dominant industry.  "The role 
of the dominant industry in regional manufacturing growth is a passive one, in that it is subsumed 
under the caption of comparative advantage or industrial structure" [Salvary 1977:2].  The 
dominant industry analytical approach was advanced in response to the criticism levelled at shift-
share analysis: "There can be no question that the degree and structure of past industrial activity 
in a region will, . . . have a major influence on the degree and structure of future industrial 
activity, but the magnitude and statistical significance of this influence could be one of the 
objects of research, not one of the assumptions of research" [Burrows, et. al. 1971:16]. 
The concept of "growth poles" [Perroux (1955)1970] focuses on growth manifesting itself 
at points or poles of growth with variable intensity spreading through different channels with 
terminal effects on the whole economy.  Whereas, the dominant industry hypothesis [Salvary 
[1977:4-5], maintains that the dominant industry in a region is the industry which best responds 
to the forces at play; as a result, this industry becomes the moving force of the region.  The 
growth of the region is then conditioned by the responsiveness of the supporting industries and 
consequentially the industrial structure of the region emerges as a consequence.   
The dominant industry hypothesis rests upon the following assumptions: 
 
(1)  The division of the economy into productive sectors: agricultural, industry, and service. 
 
(2)  The industry sector is comprised of m industries, which are contained in the finite set F.             
F  =  |f/f1,fc, ... , fm|.  These m industries are dispersed over k regions; however, f1 (and 
every f) is dispersed over n regions, where  n < k. 
 
(3) The output demand of f1 (as well as f2, ... fm) is not evenly distributed among the k  
regions. Also, there is a difference in the intensity of demand for final and intermediate 
consumption of the m industries. 
 
(4)  The transportation needs of the m industries differ, and the transportation networks 
differ among the k regions.3  
 
  
 
(5)   The availability of financial capital differs among the m industries and among the k 
regions.  The manner in which capital is made available reflects an industry capital 
preference with significant regional impact. 
 
The basic assumptions insinuate that the concept of the dominant industry brings together 
the demand and supply determinants of regional economic expansion.  The dominant industry 
emerges in a region when: (i) there is a sustained increase in regional demand for an industry's 
output, (ii) the region's capital investment preference favours that industry, and (iii) the 
transportation network which services the region is capable of handling the increase without a 
significant increase in cost [Salvary 1987:77-78].  In any given time period, any of several 
industries are potential candidates for becoming a dominant industry in a region.  Which industry 
actually becomes the or a dominant industry is dependent upon: (a) the regional capital 
investment preference, (b) the degree of capital saturation, and (c) the industry's degree of 
dependence on and the intensity of use of the transportation network [Salvary 1987:78].   
Concomitant with the development of the dominant industry is the emergence of the 
industry region: a region in economic space linked together by a common dominant industry 
[Salvary 1977:19].  Industry regions (e.g., chemical, etc.) were introduced to provide a means for 
observing the impact of the dominant industries within an idealized spatial context.  The industry 
region approach is a controlled observational approach [Salvary 1987:79].  
The firm-type dominance hypothesis of regional manufacturing growth (RMG) as developed 
in this paper, which should have significant explanatory power, is expounded as follows. 
 
A region's manufacturing output and development is conditioned by: 
 
1.   the size (measured by sales) of firms operating in the region (F
s
); 
2.   the multiplier effect (elasticity) of the region's dominant industry (DI
m
), and 
3.   the location choice options facing the firms (Ft: firm-type--national vs. local   firms). 
 
Equation 1 is the mathematical formulation of the hypothesis:  
 
             RMG    =    f(F
s
, DI
m
, Ft).                                                                              (1) 
 
In this working hypothesis, firm-type dominance maintains that a region's manufacturing 
output is dominated by either national/foreign or local firms.  The firm-type dominance 
  
 
hypothesis postulates that if a region's manufacturing output is dominated by local firms, its 
strategic posture is entirely different from that of a region dominated by national/foreign (N/F) 
firms.  The financial capital and the location decision options available to the large N/F firms are 
more favourable than those of the comparatively small local firms.  In particular, the larger N/F 
firms can ensure, by means of a significant earnings retention policy, a greater share of capital to 
satisfy its financial needs [Rumelt 1974:155; Brittain 1966:155].  Thus, financial capital is 
endogenous to the "N/F firm dominated" regional model; whereas, it is an exogenous variable to 
the "local firm dominated" regional model.  Simply understood, in many instances capital is 
simply not available to the invariably smaller local firms [Hamberg 1971:32-34; U.S. Congress 
1971:1465].  Also, the location decision options are many for the large firms already operating 
through several branch plants;3 whereas, the options are quite few for the local firms.   
 
FIRM-TYPE DOMINANCE AND  REGIONAL MANUFACTURING GROWTH 
 
As developed by Salvary [1977], an industry region construct (a region in economic space 
consisting of sub-regions having the same dominant industry), which enables the observation of 
the varying response patterns to the dominant industry, is used in this study.  The responsiveness 
of a region's supportive industries to the growth of the region's dominant industry is measured by 
means of the coefficient of elasticity.  Low responsiveness of the supportive industries can be 
attributed to either: (a) the unavailability of financial capital (local firm-type dominance) or (b) 
the external (out of region) location decision of the supportive industries' expansion 
(national/local firm-type dominance) [Salvary [1977:115,122,130].   
State economies are interdependent parts of the national economy and forces outside each 
state do impinge upon the stability of employment in a state [Engerman 1965:325].  As noted by 
Coughlin and Segev [2000:323-322]: “[A]n increasing share of manufacturing production in the 
United States is taking place under foreign rather US ownership.  In fact, despite the decline in 
manufacturing employment since 1979, manufacturing employment in foreign-owned firms more 
than doubled between 1979 and 1995.  . . . .  Given the rising share of foreign enterprises in US 
manufacturing activity, the location of new foreign-owned plants is a significant determinant of 
the geographic distribution of manufacturing employment.”   
  
 
Hence, the firm-type dominance hypothesis of regional manufacturing growth should be 
significant to policy-makers at the state and national level.  This working hypothesis postulates a 
relationship between a state's industrial structure and the variation in the impact of the dominant 
industry within an industry region.  Assuming that industrial diversification via portfolio theory 
would necessitate a selective state tax incentive strategy, apart from inducing tax wars among the 
states [Business Week 1976:92] such a strategy more likely would be ineffective due to the minor 
importance of tax in context of total business operating costs.  The Committee of New England of 
the National Planning Association [1954:645] made it quite clear that in some instances taxation 
may be the marginal element that can influence the decision in a region’s favour.  It was emphasized 
that taxes are a small percentage of costs in almost all industries.  Since all costs are seldom 
equal, it is most unlikely that the absolute differences in tax costs will be significant enough to 
overcome the differences in other costs which constitute are a larger proportion of total costs.  
Invariably, to the firms, the important determinants in industrial location, both within and among 
regions are the small differences in those costs which are a large proportion of total costs.  
 
DATA ,  METHODOLOGY, AND ANALYSIS 
 
Data were collected on: (a) plant manufacturing locations [Marketing Economics Key Plants 
1960;1969/70;1980/81]; (b) location of corporate headquarters and firm size in sales [Million 
Dollar Directory 1964,1971,1980,1987]; and (c) manufacturing value added and employees 
[Census of Manufactures 1963;1967;1972;1977;1982;1987;1992.  Annual Survey of Manufactures 
1959-60;1961;1962;1964-65;1968-69;1970-71;1988-1991;1993-1996]. Measures of elasticity 
(responsiveness of supportive industries to growth of dominant industry) for regions/states 
comprising three industry regions (1960-1971) were obtained from Salvary [1977:113,122,130].   
To associate changes with specific identifiable phenomena or emerging traits and to enable 
the impact of small firms to be observable in the amassed data, large firms are defined as firms with 
annual sales volume of $100,000,000 or more.  Table 1 presents the elasticity estimates/response 
coefficients of the regions' total manufacturing value added growth rates to the regions' dominant 
industry growth rates and changes in manufacturing employment for the states comprising the 
chemical (SICC28), electrical (SICC36), and food (SICC20) industry regions.  
  
 
 In Table 1, two groups - a high response group (HRG) and a low response group (LRG) - 
are identifiable.  The HRG consists of: Chemical industry region - Tennessee, Texas, Virginia, 
and South Carolina; Electrical industry region - Illinois, Connecticut, and Kentucky; and Food 
industry region - Missouri, Georgia, and Minnesota.  The LRG consists of: Chemical industry 
region - Alabama, West Virginia, Louisiana, and New Jersey; Electrical industry region - New 
Hampshire, Indiana, California, and Massachusetts; and Food industry region - Florida, Iowa, 
Wisconsin, and Colorado. This partitioning is necessary in order to determine the firm-size (large 
or small firms) that dominated the manufacturing activities of the high and low response groups.  
Changes in Table 1 reveal that the more significant changes occurred in the chemical industry 
region.  However, the general information pertaining to firm-type dominance can be extracted 
when comparing the data for 1970 with that of 1980.  The relative changes in manufacturing 
employees for 1980 can be a guide for policy prescription.   
Feiock and Rowland [1990] in an empirical study concluded that environmental regulation 
(i.e, the cost of pollution abatement) influences interstate allocation of investments in the chemical 
industry.  Hence, variations in state laws on environmental protection would influence location 
decisions.  Given the foregoing, the firm-type dominance hypothesis has added significance due 
to the fact that the non-local (national or foreign - N/F) firm has greater latitude in its location 
choice decision than does the local firm.  Since (Table 1) the more significant changes occurred 
in the chemical industry region, that region is chosen to assess the expected impact of regional 
firm-type dominance on regional manufacturing output.   
Apart from pollution abatement cost, other factors do contribute to restructuring in the 
various state-regions.  One factor is the relationship between international trade and regional 
economic change.  As noted by Bauer and Eberts [1990:39-40], during the 1980s, apart from a 
decline in manufacturing employment in the national economy, there has been a significant 
structural shift in (1) the location of manufacturing across states and (2) the composition of 
manufacturing within states.  Those researchers maintain that the expansion of international trade 
can have a significant impact on domestic regional economies.  Being in direct competition with 
domestic manufacturers, foreign imports can decrease domestic production by displacing 
domestic output.  Therefore, foreign imports have to be seriously considered in all policy analysis. 
  
 
____________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
TABLE 1   
TOTAL & INDUSTRY SPECIFIC MANUFACTURING VALUE ADDED GROWTH RATES FOR 1960-1971,  
REGIONAL ELASTICITIES, AND MANUFACTURING EMPLOYEES  
____________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
PANEL A: CHEMICAL INDUSTRY 
                              Exponential                                                  Manufacturing                 Manufacturing  
                                 Growth                    Elasticity/                Employees (000)                  Employees  
                            Rate For MVA             Response               1970                1980                 % Change         
State/Region             T         C                 Coefficient          T       C             T      C                T         C 
Tennessee                8.5       9.3                  0.8816             448    54           491   52               9.6     (3.7) 
Texas                       7.8       9.3                  0.6621             722     54        1046   73             44.8     35.1 
Alabama*                 7.6     16.5                  0.4007             305     12           349   14             14.1     16.7 
South Carolina*       7.6     10.6                  0.5674             324     24          391   32             20.7     33.3 
Louisiana                 7.1     13.3                  0.3871             168     22           209   31             24.4     40.9 
Virginia                    5.9        6.5                  0.6652             354     38           418   33             18.1     13.2 
New Jersey               3.3        9.7                  0.3654             859   102          814   96              (5.2)    (5.9) 
West Virginia          2.8        5.0                  0.5014             122     23           115     8              (5.7)  (65.2) 
* Chemical industry is the second most important industry but not the dominant industry.  T= Total Manufacturing  C= Chemical Manufacturing 
 
PANEL B: ELECTRICAL INDUSTRY 
                               Exponential                                                     Manufacturing                Manufacturing 
                                   Growth                   Elasticity/                   Employees (000)                 Employees    
                             Rate For MVA             Response                 1970                 1980                % Change 
State                         T         E                  Coefficient             T       E             T        E               T         E       
Kentucky*              8.3    14.1                    0.5380              168     33          209     32           24.4    ( 3.0) 
California*             5.2      9.5                     0.3966             1568    205         2075     317           32.3    54.6 
New Hampshire     4.8      9.5                     0.4982                92     17          107      17           16.3     --- 
Indiana                   4.8      8.7                     0.4873               713    111          654    103          ( 8.3)   ( 7.2) 
Illinois*                  4.3      6.5                     0.7300             1344    186        1272    159          ( 5.4)   ( 5.4) 
Connecticut*          3.6      5.4                     0.7149              446      45          463     47             3.8      9.6 
Massachusetts        2.7      5.5                     0.3320              640     97          694      95             8.4    ( 2.0)                 
* Electrical industry is the second most important industry but not the dominant industry.  T= Total Manufacturing  E= Electrical Manufacturing 
 
PANEL C: FOOD INDUSTRY 
                                   Exponential                                                        Manufacturing               Manufacturing 
                                Growth                        Elasticity/                  Employees (000)                 Employees     
                          Rate For MVA                  Response                1970                 1980               % Change 
State                        T          F                     Coefficient            T        F            T        F             T         F 
Florida                   9.1     10.2                       0.8844             324      45         452      49          39.5      8.9 
Georgia*                8.1       5.4                       1.4977             462      43         525      51          13.6     18.6 
Iowa                      6.3        5.5                       0.7136             214      51         245      46          14.5    ( 9.8) 
Minnesota              6.1       2.8                       1.4240             320      42         384      40          20.0    ( 5.0) 
Colorado               6.0        6.9                       0.2714             118      19         187      23          58.4     21.0 
Missouri*              5.0        2.6                       1.8481              444      49         439      40          ( 1.1)   (19.4) 
Wisconsin*           4.1        4.1                       0.6213              501     57         551      54           10.0      5.3 
* Food industry is the second most important industry but not the dominant industry.     T=  Total Manufacturing     F=  Food Manufacturing 
______________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
  
 
Data presented in Table 2 on pollution abatement cost for the chemical industry region 
reveal that Alabama, Louisiana, Texas, and West Virginia were adversely affected resulting in a 
decline in manufacturing capital expenditures. 
____________________________________________________________________________________________ 
TABLE 2  
EFFECT OF POLLUTION ABATEMENT COSTS ON CHEMICAL INDUSTRY REGION 
____________________________________________________________________________________________ 
                                            Per Capita Capital Investments        Pollution Abatement Expenses As A     
       State                                % Change 1977-1982                      % of Industry Shipments 1977 
 
          Alabama                                  -  3.52                                               1.65 
         Louisiana                                -21.21                                               2.12 
         New Jersey                                 1.74                                                 .47 
         South Carolina                             .77                                                 .47 
         Tennessee                                   5.41                                               1.55 
         Texas                                       -  6.18                                                 .91 
         Virginia                                         .56                                               1.22 
         West Virginia                          -  3.45                                                3.10 
____________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Table based upon data presented by Feiock and Rowland [1990:570]. 
 
Table 3 presents data for the manufacturing firms of the chemical industry region in which 
significant changes occurred.  (Alabama and South Carolina were omitted since the chemical 
industry is the second most important industry but not the dominant industry in those states.)  That 
data enable an assessment of the effect of pollution abatement cost in that region.   It is assumed 
that (a) regions dominated by small firms would be negatively affected by pollution abatement 
cost and (b) regions dominated by large firms would be less affected owing to large firms’ 
financial ability.   
While relative pollution abatement cost was the second highest in Louisiana, the per capita 
capital investment in Louisiana was the most significantly adversely affected.  The decline in per 
capita capital investments in Louisiana was 6 times greater than the decline in West Virginia and 
3 times greater than that of Texas.  Although West Virginia had the highest pollution abatement 
cost as a percentage of industry shipments, the adverse impact on capital investment was 
remarkably less severe than that of Louisiana.  Although the relative pollution abatement cost in 
Texas was slightly less than one-third that of West Virginia, surprisingly the negative impact on 
Texas was almost twice as much as the impact in West Virginia.   
  
 
____________________________________________________________________________________________ 
TABLE  3 
REGIONAL FIRM-TYPE DOMINANCE 
LARGE AND SMALL FIRMS WITH PLANTS EMPLOYING 1,000 OR MORE EMPLOYEES 
____________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
                                                           1 9 6 0                            1 9 7 0                            1 9 8 0  
State                                        Plants  Emps.     %      Plants  Emps.     %      Plants  Emps.     %  
                                                            (000)     of 3                 (000)     of 3                 (000)     of 3 
 ____________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Tennessee                          Large         19          63                        39        104                        50        111 
                                          Small         23          36                        29          38                        17          24                         
1.                                       Total         42          99        32.1         68        142        31.5         67        135        27.5 
2.  Chemical Industry                                        39        12.7                       54        12.0                       52        10.5 
 
3.  All Manufacturing                                      308      100.0                     448      100.0                      491     100.0 
 
Texas                                Large         27        137                        55        157                        78        156       
                                          Small         10          20                        23          31                        17          19 
1.                                       Total         37        157        32.2         78        188        26.0         95        175        16.8 
2.  Chemical Industry                                        40          8.2                       54          7.5                       73          7.0 
 
3.  All Manufacturing                                      486      100.0                     722      100.0                   1046      100.0 
 
Virginia                             Large         20          59                        34        117                        42          88        
                                          Small         15          23                        26          39                        14          20 
                                          Total         35          82        30.0         60        156        44.1         56        108        25.9        
2.  Chemical Industry                                        30        11.1                       38        10.7                       33          7.8 
3.  All Manufacturing                                       273     100.0                     354      100.0                      418     100.0 
 
Louisiana                          Large        14           35                        18          42                        19          42   
                                          Small          4             8                          8          11                          6            8       
1.                                       Total        18           43        37.9         26          53        31.3         25          50        23.9      
2.  Chemical Industry                                        16        13.9                       22        13.3                       31        15.0 
3.  All Manufacturing                                       113     100.0                     168      100.0                     209      100.0 
 
New Jersey                       Large        65         196                        82        223                        83        191 
                                          Small        52           75                        27          40                        23          31       
                                          Total      117         271         33.2      109        263         30.7      106        222        27.3      
2.  Chemical Industry                                        81          9.9                     102         11.9                      96        11.7 
3.  All Manufacturing                                      816       100.0                    859      100.0                     813      100.0 
 
West Virginia                   Large       14            43                        24          42                        17          36 
                                          Small       10            15                          2            3                          3            5         
                                          Total       24            58         48.9        26          45        36.4         20          41        35.6      
2.  Chemical Industry                                        22         19.0                      23        18.7                         8          6.9 
3.  All Manufacturing                                      117       100.0                    122      100.0                     115      100.0 
____________________________________________________________________________________________ 
The source for data on plants with 1,000 or more employees is Marketing Economics Key Plants.  
  
 
In 1970, West Virginia was a large firm-type dominated region.  Hence, it comes as no 
surprise that in West Virginia, there was reduction in large firms (from 24 in 1970 to 17 in 1980)  
due to either plant closings or plant relocations to other regions due to pollution abatement cost. 
For the HRG (group with high response to growth of the dominant industry), the data 
reveal a definite size effect of the pollution abatement cost in Texas.  Tennessee and Virginia had 
positive capital investments.  However, Texas, with large firms accounting for 82% of all firms,  
had a significant decline in per capital investment.  For the LRG (group with low response to 
growth of the dominant industry), except for New Jersey, there is a size effect - a small firm 
effect in Louisiana, and a large firm effect in West Virginia.  The reduction in importance of 
large firms in West Virginia is attributable to the relative magnitude of the pollution abatement 
cost.  In West Virginia, the cost was approximately 21/2 times that of Tennessee and 11/2 half 
times that of Texas.  In New Jersey the impact was relatively insignificant due to the fact that the 
pollution abatement cost was a mere 15.5% of the cost experienced in West Virginia.   
Data in Table 4 on small firms, as a percent of large firms engaged in manufacturing, 
provide a vivid portrayal of the rather dramatic impact of the pollution abatement cost on small 
firms being the dominant firm-type of a region’s manufacturing activities.  As stated earlier, 
regions dominated by small firms would be more negatively affected by adverse regional 
conditions than regions dominated by large firms.  The financial capabilities of large firms enable 
them to withstand adverse operating conditions better than smaller firms.   
____________________________________________________________________________________________ 
TABLE  4 
REGIONAL FIRM-TYPE DOMINANCE 
PLANTS AND EMPLOYEES:  SMALL FIRMS AS A PERCENT OF  LARGE FIRMS 
PLANTS EMPLOYING 1,000 OR MORE EMPLOYEES 
____________________________________________________________________________________________ 
                                                                1 9 6 0                               1 9 7 0                                1 9 8 0  
            State                            Plants   Emps.            Plants   Emps.            Plants   Emps.            
                                                    %         %                     %         %                     %         %________ 
              Tennessee                         121        57                      74         36                      34         22 
             New Jersey                         80        38                      33         18                      28         16 
             Virginia                              75        39                      76         33                      33         23 
             West Virginia                    71        35                        8           7                      18         14 
             Texas                                  40        15                      40         20                      22         12 
             Louisiana                           29        23                      44         26                      31         19 
____________________________________________________________________________________________ 
  
 
EXPLANATION OF VARIATIONS AS SUGGESTED BY THE  HYPOTHESIS 
 
Data in Table 1 revealed regional variation in responsiveness to growth of the dominant 
industry.  Since manufacturing mix may be a causal factor, it is necessary to look at states with 
significantly different total manufacturing value added growth rates in comparison to the growth 
rates of the dominant industry to determine if mix can explain the variation.   
Both improving and deteriorating conditions that can be ascribed to firm-type dominance 
are disclosed in Table 3.  The rank correlation for the growth rates for total manufacturing value 
added and chemical manufacturing data is .31, which is statistically insignificant.  No significant 
correlation existed among the paired observations.  Since manufacturing mix is not a sufficient 
condition for similarity in intra-region manufacturing linkage, it is argued that regional 
manufacturing growth is explainable by the firm-type dominance of regional manufacturing 
output.   
Data in Table 5 provide further evidence to support the hypothesis; that is, variation (high 
versus low responsiveness) in regional performance may be explained in terms of the non-local 
(N/F) firm versus local firm dominance in a region (state).  In the classification of firms as being 
a local or non-local firm, when in the few instances that the location of a firm's headquarters 
could not be determined from the available data, the firm was classified as non-local.  This aspect 
of the classification process most likely leads to an understatement of  the number of local firms. 
The 1980 data on local versus non-local headquarters of the regional firms provide insight  
on the impact of firm-type dominance.  Since Texas, New Jersey, Louisiana, and Tennessee 
(ranked third, fifth, seventh, and ninth respectively among 38 states based upon cumulative 
manufacturing capital expenditures for the period: 1960-1971[Salvary 1977:186]) are capital 
abundant states (states that experienced large amounts of financial capital flows), the 
lackadaisical responsiveness to the growth of the dominant industry (the low elasticity 
evidenced) in Louisiana and in New Jersey may be accounted for as noted in Table 6.  In Panel C 
of Table 5, the four states were N/F firm-type dominated.  Yet the responses of the supporting 
industries to the growth of the dominant industry (as reflected in the total manufacturing growth 
in those regions) were significantly different to those of Texas and Tennessee. 
  
 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
TABLE  5 
REGIONAL FIRM TYPE DOMINANCE 
LOCAL VERSUS NONLOCAL FIRMS MANUFACTURING PLANTS 
(% of Plants Owned by Local Firms to Total Plants) 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
Panel A:  1960                All Firms                         Local    Firms                              Non-local    Firms 
State                               Total Plants               Total        Large     Small                Total    Large   Small 
New Jersey                           117                 39 (33.3%)       8            31                     78          57         21       
Tennessee                              42                 11 (26.2%)       0            11                     31          19         12 
Texas                                     37                  10 (27.0%)       5              5                     27          22           5 
Virginia                                 35                  12 (34.3%)       3              9                     23          17           6 
West Virginia                       24                    3 (12.5%)       2              1                     21          12           9 
Louisiana                              18                    1 (  5.5%)       0              1                     17          14           3 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
Panel B:  1970                All Firms                         Local    Firms                              Non-local    Firms 
State                               Total Plants              Total          Large    Small               Total    Large   Small    
New Jersey                           109                34 (31.1%)        19           15                    75         63         12 
Texas                                     78                27 (34.6%)        12           15                    51         43           8 
Tennessee                              68                16 (23.5%)          3           13                    52         36         16        
Virginia                                  60                16 (26.7%)          5           11                    44         29         15 
Louisiana                               26                   4 (15.4%)          1             3                    22         18           4 
West Virginia                       26                   0 ( 0.0%)           0             0                    26         24           2 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
Panel C:  1980                All Firms                        Local   Firms                               Non-local  Firms 
State                               Total Plants            Total            Large   Small                Total    Large   Small    
New Jersey                         106                 40 (37.8%)         31           9                      66         52         14 
Texas                                   95                 35 (36.8%)         25         10                      60         53           7 
Tennessee                            67                 13 (20.0%)           5           8                      54         45           9        
Virginia                                56                 18 (32.1%)         10           8                      38         32           6 
Louisiana                             25                   5 (20.0%)           3           2                      20         16           4        
West Virginia                     20                   1 ( 5.0%)           1           0                      19         16           3 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
TABLE 6  
DISSIMILAR RESPONSES OF LARGE LOCAL AND N/F FIRM-TYPE DOMINANCE  
____________________________________________________________________________________________  
                                                                                      Elasticity/               Growth Rate* of           Growth Rate* of 
                         Ten Year Cumulative       Response        Total Manufacturing        Total Capital   
                 Capital Expenditures       Coefficient           Value Added               Expenditures 
State                     $000,000     Rank                 %                    %        Rank                %         Rank 
Texas                     10,500         3                .6621                7.8          3                14.9         3        
New Jersey              6,718         5                .3654                3.3          9                  8.6         9 
Louisiana                3,810         7                .3871                7.1          4                17.2         1 
Tennessee                3,600         9                .8816                8.5          1                14.1         4 
                                                                                                                                           *Exponential Growth Rates 
Source: Response Coefficient in Table 1 above - Remainder from Salvary [1977:186 - Table 82].  
  
 
Since manufacturing activities in Louisiana and New Jersey are dominated by large NF and 
local firms, the low elasticity evidenced would suggest that the leakage out of those regions is 
due to the failure of capital to flow to the firms in the supportive industries to enable them to 
expand (respond) pari-passu with the warranted growth fostered by the growth of the dominant 
industry.  In particular, the low elasticity evidenced reveals that the leakage out of Louisiana is 
due primarily to horrendous pollution abatement cost.  Consequently, the large (N/F and local) 
firms in Louisiana’s supportive industries have simply relocated manufacturing operations to 
other regions.  Increased demand brought about by the dominant industry is satisfied by the N/F 
firms either by expanding output of the supportive industries at branch plants in other regions to 
obtain internal economies of scale or by the construction of new plants in totally new regions.4 
Another factor to be considered is the significant impact of foreign direct investment in US 
manufacturing.  As noted by Coughlin [1992:17] “Foreign Direct Investment in the United States 
increased more than eleven-fold between 1977 and 1990.”   Table 7 [Coughlin 1992:17] provides 
data for 1980 and 1990 during which time the growth was five times.  In that period 380 new 
foreign-owned plants were established in the US - 239 in the three industry regions: 102 - chemical 
industry region, 87 - electrical industry region, and 50 - food industry region.  76 of the 102 
plants are located in states in which the chemical industry is the dominant industry -Tennessee 
20, Texas 27, Virginia 17, New Jersey 7, Louisiana 4, and West Virginia 1; and the remaining 26 
plants are located in states in which the chemical industry is not the dominant but the second 
most important industry, 18 in South Carolina and 8 in Alabama.   
____________________________________________________________________________________________ 
TABLE 7 
FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT IN THE UNITED STATES BY INDUSTRY 
 (Dollar Amounts in Billions)  
__________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
                                                                               1980                                             1990  
             Industry                                       Level $              Share %            Level $              Share %  
             Manufacturing                               33.0                    39.8                 160.0                   39.6  
             All Other Industries                       50.0                    60.2                 343.7                   60.4  
             Total                                               83.0                  100.0                 403.7                 100.0  
____________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Table 8 provides the changes in manufacturing for 1987-1996 as compared to 1960-1971.  
The impact of foreign investment is readily noticeable in West Virginia.   
  
 
______________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
TABLE 8   
REGION AND INDUSTRY SPECIFIC MANUFACTURING VALUE ADDED EXPONENTIAL GROWTH 
RATES AND MANUFACTURING CAPITAL EXPENDITURES EXPONENTIAL GROWTH RATES 
FOR THE PERIODS 1960-1971 AND 1987-1996 
______________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
PANEL A: CHEMICAL  INDUSTRY REGION 
State/Region           TMVA          CMVA              TMVA            CMVA             TMCE          CMCE        
                             1960-1971      1960-1971        1987-1996      1987-1996         1987-1996      1987-1996 
Tennessee                  8.5                 9.3                      5.8                 3.3                     4.0                 1.9 
Texas                         7.8                 9.3                      6.1                 3.2                    9.3                  7.4 
Alabama*                   7.6               16.5                      4.7                 9.0                     5.3                 9.3 
South Carolina*         7.6               10.6                      6.2                 7.9                     4.7                 7.6 
Louisiana                   7.1               13.3                      4.3                 3.5                     7.0                 6.9     
Virginia                      5.9                 6.5                      5.1                4.0                     6.1                     5.3           
New Jersey                 3.3                 9.7                      1.5                 1.9                     0.8                 0.5 
West Virginia            2.8                 5.0                       5.2                   8.1                     4.4                 5.1 
*Chemical industry is second most important industry but not the dominant industry. TM= Total Manufacturing  CM= Chemical Manufacturing 
PANEL B: ELECTRICAL INDUSTRY REGION 
State/Region               TMVA      EMVA              TMVA              EMVA             TMCE            EMCE     
                                1960-1971   1960-1971         1987-1996         1987-1996       1987-1996       1987-1996 
Kentucky*                     8.3             14.1                   17.3                   (1.1)                 8.1                   6.8 
California*                    5.2               9.5                     3.5                    9.2                  5.5                  12.1 
New Hampshire            4.8               9.5                     4.2                  13.5                     4.4                   8.8 
Indiana                          4.8               8.7                     5.3                    1.8                   3.5                   1.3 
Illinois*                         4.3              6.5                     4.6                    7.3                   5.4                   6.8 
Connecticut*                 3.6               5.4                     1.2                    2.0                   3.4                   7.1 
Massachusetts               2.7               5.5                     2.4                    5.0                   3.9                   4.6 
*Electrical industry is second most important industry but not the dominant industry. TM= Total Manufacturing   EM= Electrical Manufacturing 
PANEL C: FOOD INDUSTRY RERION  
State/Region              TMVA         FMVA             TMVA              FMVA           TMCE             FMCE     
                                1960-1971    1960-1971        1987-1996         1987-1996      1987-1996       1987-1996 
Florida                           9.1             10.2                   4.1                      2.7                  3.2                   1.9 
Georgia*                        8.1              5.4                    5.2                     7.5                  4.4                   8.8 
Iowa                               6.3               5.5                    6.7                     6.2                  9.4                   6.6 
Minnesota                     6.1               2.8                    4.3                     5.6                  5.4                   9.5 
Colorado                       6.0               6.9                    5.7                      5.5                10.0                   3.3 
Missouri*                      5.0               2.6                    4.6                     7.4                  7.4                   6.2 
Wisconsin*                   4.1               4.1                    6.0                     3.9                  7.4                   7.8 
*  Food industry is the second most important industry but not the dominant industry.     TM=  Total Manufacturing  FM=  Food Manufacturing 
____________________________________________________________________________________________ 
VA = Value Added  CE = Capital Expenditures    
CM = Chemical Manufacturing  EM = Electrical Manufacturing FM = Food Manufacturing . 
 
In the chemical industry region, based on ranking in terms of Share of Plants/Gross State 
Product [Coughlin and Segev 2000:Table 1], South Carolina (rank #2), Tennessee (rank #4), and 
Virginia (rank #10) benefited immensely in that order from new foreign plants.  Texas (rank #18) 
  
 
also benefited significantly but to a lesser extent than the three states mentioned above. This 
finding is not surprising as Coughlin [1992:27] noted: the chemical industry is controlled by 
foreign firms.  In addition, other states belonging to other industry regions with very high 
rankings were significant beneficiaries.  In the electrical industry region, Kentucky, in which 
chemical manufacturing is fourth in importance, was ranked #1, and Indiana, in which chemical 
manufacturing is also fourth in importance, was ranked #7.  In the food industry region, Iowa, in 
which chemical manufacturing is fourth in importance, was ranked #8, and Georgia, in which 
chemical manufacturing is third in importance, was ranked #9.   
Apart from a decline in manufacturing employment in the national economy, the data 
underlined and in script in Table 8 are suggestive of the significant structural shift during the 
1980s in manufacturing across states and the composition of manufacturing within states.  This 
combination of occurrence can be attributed to both international trade as noted by Bauer and 
Eberts [1990] and direct foreign investment in US manufacturing as documented by Coughlin 
and Segev [2000] and Coughlin [1992] 
 
SUMMARY 
 
This paper suggests that regions can be classified by firm-type (national/foreign or local) 
dominance of manufacturing output.  This distinction is important for policy analysis, since two 
critical variables (capital availability and location decision) can be identified with regional output 
modeling.  The impact on a particular region of these two variables depends upon the firm-type 
dominance of that region's manufacturing output.  This paper draws upon the dominant industry 
model which has established that: (1) in any given region, there is a dominant industry (the 
industry which is the driving force of the region), and (2) the manufacturing growth of a region is 
linked to the growth of the region’s dominant industry.  
An industry region construct (a region in economic space consisting of state regions 
having the same dominant industry) is used to enable the observation of the varying response 
patterns to the dominant industry.  Leakage of manufacturing output from a state region, due to 
the inability of a region's supportive industries to respond to the growth of the dominant industry, 
can be explained by the firm-type dominance hypothesis.  Elasticity coefficients of the state 
  
 
regions within an industry region are utilized to measure a region's responsiveness to the 
dominant industry.  The elasticity coefficients (responsiveness) of the individual state regions’ 
manufacturing output to growth of the region's dominant industry can be used by regional 
policymakers to assess the feasibility of manufacturing diversification policies a la portfolio 
theory.   Low responsiveness of supportive industries producing regional shifts in manufacturing 
is identifiable with: (a) the unavailability of capital due to local firm-type dominance or (b) the 
out of region location decision of the supportive industries' expansion due to national/foreign 
firm-type dominance. 
   
 LIMITATIONS AND CONCLUSION 
 
Given the limited amount of data employed in testing the hypothesis, the results only 
provide some preliminary findings, which are subject to further verification.  This study did not 
attempt to assess the impact of foreign imports in the displacement of domestic output, thereby 
decreasing domestic production.  The impact of this variable has to be given full consideration in 
policy analysis and development.  Future research should focus on: (a) calibrating the model with 
spatial data by expanding the number of industry regions, (b) changing the definition of large 
firm size from the $100 million to $1 billion in sales, (c) assessing the regional displacement  
impact of foreign imports, and (c) subjecting the hypothesis to rigorous statistical testing.  
The preliminary findings suggest that, assuming portfolio theory is feasible, firm-type 
dominance should be considered when implementing a diversification policy.  Since there are far 
more important determinants of industrial location than tax-breaks, a region should not expect 
that a tax-break will induce firms to locate future manufacturing expansion in that region.  Owing 
to their friendly manufacturing environments - infrastructure, research facilities, trained labour 
force, educational facilities, and other public goods - many state-regions have benefited from 
foreign direct investment.  If an appropriate operating environment is established in a region, N/F 
firms will invite themselves into the region.  Apparently analysis utilizing the Firm-Type 
Dominance/Industry Region Model could provide a sound basis for understanding regional 
manufacturing problems and aid in the formulation of relevant fiscal policies at the regional and 
federal levels of government.  
  
 
ENDNOTES 
 
1   In one study of the influences on patterns of industrial location, McHone [1984] recognized the 
limitation of the SMSA and the significance of the state as the region in this setting.  Accordingly, 
McHone [1984] limited his observations to SMSAs that straddled more than one state to determine 
the impact of incentives on locational decisions.  hUallachain [1989:1205] empirical study focused on 
economies of scale and as such justifies the use of the metropolitan statistical area as "the appropriate 
geographical scale for testing models of growth ... ." 
 
2
   Both Richardson [1978] and Gerking and Isserman [1981:465] are advocates of the integrated 
approach.  
 
3   Overlapping concentric zones, which are comprised of a few contiguous regions and influence 
transportation-dependent industry location, are created by the transportation networks. 
 
4   According to Moriarty [1991:1576], in 1982 76% of the US manufacturing workforce was employed 
by multi-plant firms; whereas in 1947 the portion employed by multi-plant firms was 56%.  
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